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Increased demand for corn from ethanol plants, short wheat crops, and stagnant South American soy-
bean yields have led to $3.00 corn, 
$5.00 wheat, and $6.00 soybeans. 
These high prices suggest that pro-
ducers of these commodities should 
not expect any loan defi ciency pay-
ments or countercyclical payments 
for either their 2006 or 2007 crops. 
If futures prices are any indication, 
then farmers might not see any pay-
ments from these programs for at 
least three or four years. High prices 
will not affect direct payments, of 
course. So $2.1 billion in annual aid 
will fl ow to corn farmers, $1.15 bil-
lion will go to wheat farmers, and 
soybean farmers will receive $608 
million for both crop years despite 
the high prices.
A lack of payments is good 
news for farmers, our budget 
defi cit, and our trading partners. 
Farmers get to enjoy the benefi ts of 
high prices; the budget defi cit will 
be relatively smaller; and our com-
modity programs will have minimal 
impact on world prices. However, 
high prices pose a dilemma for 
farm groups and their supporters 
in Congress. The current set of 
programs was designed to gener-
ate payments to offset low prices. 
What should be done with our cur-
rent programs if we are entering a 
period of high prices?
Although it is hazardous to 
forecast how Congress is likely to 
respond to high prices, past experi-
ence suggests a probability of near 
zero that Congress will declare the 
end of farm subsidies. Three more 
likely options for Congress are
1. Declare victory over low prices 
but keep current programs and 
associated target prices in place 
just in case this victory is short-
lived.
2. Keep current programs but raise 
target prices for all crops or for 
those crops that would not oth-
erwise receive payments.
3. Change farm programs so that 
they provide a better fi nancial 
safety net, with payments arriv-
ing when they are needed. 
Before turning to a more detailed look 
at each of these options, it might be 
instructive to see how Congress re-
sponded with changes in farm legisla-
tion in earlier periods of high prices.
Responses to High Prices 
in Previous Farm Bills
The commodity price boom in the 
mid-1970s resulted in support levels 
that were far below market prices. 
Congress responded with farm 
legislation in 1973, 1977, and 1981 
that increased loan rates and target 
prices. Before the boom, corn loan 
rates were $1.35/bu. At their peak, 
loan rates hit $2.55/bu. Target prices 
for corn increased from $1.38/bu to a 
peak of $3.03/bu. The most common 
justifi cation for this rapid increase in 
price supports was to combat rising 
production costs.
In 1995, Congress was again 
faced with a choice about what to 
do in a period when market prices 
were above price support levels. At 
that time, strong export demand, a 
weak dollar, and production prob-
lems resulted in high prices in 1995 
and 1996. Prices were also expected 
to remain strong for several years. 
Congress responded quite differently 
with the 1996 farm bill. Rather than 
raise target prices, Congress eliminat-
ed the defi ciency payment program 
and funded the direct payment pro-
gram, assuring farmers of payments 
during what was expected to be a 
strong price period.
The graph on page 2 shows 
the history of total support levels 
and market prices for corn through 
2005. (The pictures for wheat and 
cotton are similar.) The run-up in 
market prices during the 1970s was 
closely followed by a run-up in sup-
port levels. The run-up in prices in 
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the mid-1990s actually resulted in 
a brief decline in support, until the 
market loss assistance payments 
were paid out in 1998. The mainte-
nance of support levels in 2002 is 
clearly revealed.
It is interesting to consider what 
U.S. agriculture would look like to-
day had Congress simply left sup-
port prices at their 1970 levels. The 
overall pattern of market prices for 
corn would look largely as it does 
in the graph, with some exceptions. 
High government support prices in 
the early 1980s undoubtedly ex-
panded planted acreage, but annual 
set-asides somewhat counteracted 
these effects. The large buildup of 
stocks in the mid-1980s kept prices 
from rising higher than they oth-
erwise would have in the drought 
year of 1988. And prices would not 
have risen as high as they did in the 
drought year of 1983 except for the 
large acreage reduction effort that 
year. But, especially since 1996, the 
overall pattern of prices and produc-
tion have been largely unaffected 
by the billions of dollars in federal 
support given to corn farmers over 
this period. That is, if government 
had chosen to wean farmers from 
support in 1972, the U.S. Corn Belt 
would look mostly like it does to-
day. The large run-up in commod-
ity prices in the 1970s would have 
occurred. And we still would have 
had the farm crises in the mid-1980s, 
high prices in the mid-1990s, low 
prices in the late 1990s, and bumper 
corn crops in 1994, 2004, and 2005. 
Ultimately, what we have to show for 
the billions of dollars that have been 
spent supporting corn farmers are 
perhaps a bit higher corn produc-
tion, somewhat higher land prices 
and wealthier landowners, and some 
cases in which farmers’ transition 
out of agriculture was made easier 
by payments. Whether these ac-
complishments are enough to justify 
the costs is an open question, but it 
is important to keep these long-run 
impacts in mind as we decide what 
to do with the next farm bill.
Three Alternative Paths
Extend the 2002 Farm Bill
For all the domestic and interna-
tional criticism aimed at the 2002 
farm bill, extension of its commodity 
provisions would represent a move 
to a free-market program regime 
for corn, soybeans, and wheat. The 
impact of the biofuels boom on the 
demand for corn should mean that 
market prices for all three commodi-
ties could remain above levels that 
trigger countercyclical and loan de-
fi ciency payments at current target 
History of market prices and support prices for corn through 2005
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prices and loan rates. Direct pay-
ments would still fl ow to producers, 
but these payments have little effect 
on planting decisions.  
Maintenance of current target 
prices and loan rates would also 
give Congress and farmers assur-
ance that a repeat of the late 1990s 
could not occur. Elimination of the 
defi ciency payment program in 1996 
left only the nonrecourse loan pro-
gram and AMTA (Agricultural Market 
Transition Act) payments to cushion 
the blow of low prices. Congress felt 
that this was an inadequate cushion 
and passed emergency payments 
beginning in 1998 and made perma-
nent this level of support with the 
countercyclical payment program 
in 2002. Maintenance of current pro-
grams at current target prices would 
mean that if prices were to return to 
the low levels of the late 1990s, then 
farmers would be assured of large 
payments.
Depending on the intricacies of 
budget scoring, holding the line on 
target prices could free up funds 
for use in other areas of the farm 
bill, such as conservation, re-
search, energy, nutrition, and rural 
development, where a good case 
can be made for spending scarce 
public funds on programs that 
serve broad public interests. 
The most vocal advocate for 
extension of current provisions 
of the farm bill is the American 
Farm Bureau Federation. It will be 
interesting to see if Farm Bureau’s 
position will change this winter 
given that its farmer members 
who grow corn, soybeans, and 
wheat will be receiving few pay-
ments over the next few years. 
Raise Target Prices
An alternative to simply extending 
current provisions is to keep current 
programs but to “rebalance” target 
prices. Soybean and wheat growers 
have received almost no support 
from countercyclical payments since 
this program’s inception, and corn 
farmers should not expect to see any 
support for the next few years. But 
rice and cotton producers likely will 
continue to receive both marketing 
loans and countercyclical payments.  
Already, the National Associa-
tion of Wheat Growers is advocat-
ing a 24 percent increase in the 
wheat target price. The two justifi -
cations they give for this proposed 
increase are that the current target 
price is too low given current mar-
ket prices and that wheat farmers 
have simply not received their fair 
share of payments. The American 
Soybean Association in an October 
12  press release asks “Congress to 
correct inequities under the cur-
rent Farm Bill where target prices 
for oilseed crops are dispropor-
tionately low compared to other 
program crops.”
A rebalancing of target prices 
requires some idea of what should 
be in balance. Should target prices 
be set so that per-acre payments 
are equalized? Should they be set to 
refl ect past market prices? Should 
target prices refl ect production 
costs somehow? Or should they be 
balanced to minimize their impact 
on planting decisions? When target 
prices are rebalanced, should cot-
ton and rice prices be lowered or 
should we only consider increasing 
support levels?
A more fundamental question 
that should be addressed before tar-
get prices are raised is what exactly 
is supposed to be accomplished by 
commodity programs. Does a lack 
of payments to wheat and soybean 
farmers (and corn farmers in the fu-
ture) somehow mean that farm pro-
grams are failing? Or does it mean 
that wheat and soybean farmers do 
not need public support because 
market prices are high enough?  
Using payment fl ow to farmers 
regardless of market conditions as a 
metric of success of farm programs 
is consistent with what we know 
about the long-term impacts of farm 
programs discussed earlier—higher 
land prices, wealthier landowners, 
and easier transition of farmers out 
of agriculture. That is, if all farm 
programs are supposed to accom-
plish is to make land prices higher 
than what market returns would 
otherwise dictate, then an increase 
in target prices to assure continued 
payments would be justifi ed.
Improve the Farm Safety Net
Rarely if ever do we hear anyone 
argue that increased land prices are 
the goal of commodity programs. 
Rather, we most commonly hear 
leaders talk about the need for a 
secure farm safety net to help farm-
ers withstand unexpected fi nancial 
stress. The biggest source of fi nan-
cial stress to wheat and soybean 
producers since passage of the 2002 
farm bill has been low yields caused 
by multi-year drought, not low 
prices. And legislators from wheat 
country have been the strongest ad-
vocates of a new disaster assistance 
program.
The growing support for yet 
another disaster assistance program 
is evidence that Congress has failed 
to make subsidized crop insurance 
the centerpiece of a farm safety net. 
Despite billions of dollars in pre-
mium subsidies, billions of dollars 
subsidizing agent commissions, and 
billions of dollars subsidizing the 
risk-taking of crop insurance com-
panies, Congress seems poised to 
spend billions more on some sort of 
disaster package.
A more fundamental 
question that should be 
addressed before target 
prices are raised is what 
exactly is supposed to 
be accomplished by 
commodity programs.
Continued on page 13
FALL 2006            CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT      13 
Iowa Ag Review
The third alternative approach 
that Congress could take with the 
2007 farm bill is to change farm pro-
grams to eliminate any holes in the 
farm safety net. There are three such 
holes that could be fi lled: uninsured 
acreage, the large crop insurance de-
ductible, and the impact of multi-year 
losses on crop insurance guarantees. 
Uninsured acreage could be 
remedied by simply extending insur-
ance protection to all who desire 
it by making it part of the farm bill. 
High deductibles are necessary in 
a crop insurance program because 
they discourage cheating. However, 
the most popular crop insurance 
program among Illinois corn pro-
ducers in 2006, Group Risk Income 
Protection (GRIP), has low deduct-
ibles because it insures county reve-
nue rather than farm revenue. Also, 
because GRIP bases its guarantee 
levels on long-term trend yields, two 
or three consecutive years of low 
yields in a county have no impact 
on a farmer’s guarantees.
A farm policy that simply gave 
a GRIP-style policy to producers 
Farm Policy Amid High Prices
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would thus provide the basis for a 
sound safety net that would elimi-
nate any economic justifi cation 
for disaster assistance programs. 
The cost of giving GRIP to produc-
ers would be relatively modest 
compared to running GRIP through 
the crop insurance program. On 
a per-acre basis, taxpayers cur-
rently support GRIP in the crop 
insurance program with subsidies 
to premiums, delivery costs, and 
reinsurance costs at such a level 
that farmers could be given a GRIP-
based policy at the 94 percent 
coverage level in the farm bill at an 
equivalent cost. If this were done, 
then the one remaining safety net 
hole would be variations in farm 
yield not refl ected in county yields, 
also called yield basis risk. This 
remaining risk could be largely 
covered by new crop insurance 
products offered by crop insurance 
companies. 
A growing number of groups, 
including the American Farmland 
Trust and the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, advocate reform of 
farm policy around some sort of 
revenue insurance program. Some-
what surprisingly, the National 
Corn Growers Association is also 
considering supporting this kind 
of reform. The groups’ proposals 
vary, but they all have in common 
the idea that commodity programs 
should be designed to deliver a 
sound fi nancial safety net for farm-
ers and that rural America would 
be better served by greater empha-
sis on the other titles in the next 
farm bill. ◆
A farm policy that 
simply gave a GRIP-
style policy to producers 
would thus provide 
the basis for a sound 
safety net that would 
eliminate any economic 
justifi cation for disaster 
assistance programs. 
